tion protection is a responsibility of the commander; advice on probable effects of radiation exposure to guide command decision is a medical responsibility.
When the problem is national survival, it is a question of how much radiation people can take; using safe or permissible exposure levels as a guide would impose impossible restrictions on the conduct of field operations.
The "Rules and Standards for Maintaining Operational Efficiency in the Face of Radiation Exposure" which have been recommended by Emergency I-Jealth Services for control of radiation exposure of the general public and of civilian and military operational personnel are well conceived, and offer the best advice available in the light of present knowledge of radiation effects in humans.
Reduction of Fallout Radiation Hazards in Health Installations
XV. R. WATERS, M.Sc.,* Ottawa, Ont.
AN EFFECT of a nuclear weapon which is of great concern to the general public is the phenomenon of radioactive fallout. This return to earth of the radioactive products of the bomb, together with debris of the target, results in the "dusting" of large areas with radioactive matter whereby environments of radiation of varying intensity are produced. The exposure of people to such environments constitutes a health hazard which will vary in seriousness from mild sickness to death.
Hospital installations, by their nature and function, are sensitive to the consequence of involvement in radioactive fallout; and medical directors and hospital administrators constantly seek advice from Emergency Health Services as to the radiation hazard, to their patients and staff, which might arise in the event of nuclear war, and how such hazard may be combated. This paper is intended to provide a framework within which individual instances will be found to lie.
It is important to understand from the beginning that the amount of radioactivity associated with a nuclear weapon is not measured by the energy yield of the weapon but by the amount of the weapon yield constituted by the fissionable component; that is, the uranium or plutonium which must react first in order to provide the energy necessary to start the hydrogen reaction. Fallout radiation is basically a side effect of a nuclear reaction, the blast and heat being the primary military tools. Bigger bombs do not necessarily mean larger quantities of radioactive products in the fallout, and technical advances in bomb design will undoubtedly result in a continuing reduction in the fission-fusion ratio, but it is improbable that *Radjologjcal Defence Officer, Special Weapons Section, Emergency Health Services, Department of National Health and Welfare, Ottawa, Ont.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to provide guidance for Canadian hospital medical directors in planning the provision of protection for their patients and staff against gamma radiation hazard from nuclear war. The implications of the distribution of fallout in Canada are that the probability of exposures in excess of 600 r in the period "96 hours after fallout" is high in Southern Ontario and Quebec but low in the western provinces and in the North. All hospitals should have a shielding capacity; for many, this will entail structural alterations. The aim would be to provide a protective factor of 100 or better, together with necessary standards of habitability. The engineering significance of the recommendations is discussed. a nuclear weapon will ever be completely freed of radioactivity.
Another important factor from the Canadian point of view is that Canada constitutes the fringe of the North American nuclear battleground. This means that the distribution of fallout will show greater variation from south to north and east to xvest in Canada than in the United States-even taking into consideration vehicles destroyed in transit. Nonetheless, large numbers of the Canadian population will be at risk from fallout radiation.
Thc Occurrence of Fallout in Canada It will be appreciated that, owing to variations in meteorological conditions from day to day, to-gether with variations in weight and distribution of an actual thermonuclear attack, it is not possible to state quantitatively in advance the radiological environment which will exist at any specific point on the day of an attack. However, this does not mean that a reasonable evaluation of the sort of radiation intensities which might likely develop after an attack and the probability of their occurrence may not be obtained by previous theoretical consideration.
Since the distribution of fallout debris is largely dependent on the speed and direction of the stratospheric winds, it can be calculated for any particular mathematical vector and stated attack pattern. From a knowledge of the statistical frequency and variations of these wind speeds and directions, the distribution probabilities can be computed. Such a study has been made for Canada by the Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment.1 Included in this study were about 500 points of interest to Emergency Health Services, and the results have been made available to us. Shielding A further important pre-attack contribution to radiation protective measures is the assessment of radiation shielding capability available and the improvement of such shelter facilities. This shielding capacity is usually expressed by the term "protection factor".
Protection factor may be defined as the number of times the shielding structure reduces the inten sity of the radiation as it penetrates into the structure. Any structure may be assessed for protection factor by means of a mathematical procedure employing a knowledge of the materials, the method of construction and a plan of the building. This will be discussed at greater length in the ensuing discussion.
Dosage Limitations
In radiation protection planning, these two properties are employed in conjunction with exposure limitations. For the health protection of the public, it is desirable to attempt to limit exposure to 25 roentgens during the three-month post-attack emergency period. This figure has been arrived at from the maximum "once in a lifetime" dose for occupational workers in the radiation field recommended by the International Committee for Radiation Protection. It is not to be regarded as a hard figure, but rather it should be a value below which we should endeavour to keep exposure and above .vhich exposure may be incurred reluctantly. Those who are engaged in survival operations. however, must accept somewhat greater health risks if their necessary tasks are to be effectively carried out. For these people, as stated by another contributor to this issue, an expusure of 100 roentgens in a period of up to six weeks may be Canad. Med. Ass. J. Dec. 1. 1962, vol. 87 incurred as an operational necessity, and for periods greater than six weeks the maximum aggregate limit of exposure should not exceed 200 roentgens. These are the limitations which we seek to place on exposure to gamma radiations. Locations of health installations and shielding capacities of structures should be examined with these criteria in mind.
Where persons experience exposure to gamma radiation in excess of 100 r in a 96-hour period, sickness is increasingly likely to occur; and where the exposure is 600 r or more in the same period, most persons will die. It is believed that patients suffering from disease or traumatic injury are more sensitive to radiation than are healthy persons, and to them the consequences of exposure to much lower dosages than the above would be deleterious.
A Classification of Hospital Locations
From the study of fallout distribution probabilities, a comparative classification of points can be made where hospitals of interest are located throughout the country. This classification system is based on the chance that a certain exposure level may or may not be exceeded. The index exposure that we have taken in the first instance has been 600 roentgens unprotected exposure during the 96-hour period after arrival of fallout. The period "96 hours" is regarded as the period during which the received dosage would have maximum biological effect. Any further exposure would not significantly add to the injury. The implication of this is that, in these circumstances, patients and health workers would receive not more than 20 to 25 roentgens during this period, provided that their hospital had some area where the protection factor was at least 25. In most cases, it is possible to provide shelter accommodation, in hospitals, having a protection factor of 100 or better, either through utilizing existing space or through improving the protection factor of the most sheltered area in the hospital.
Another index that may be obtained from the distribution data is the hour when the exterior intensity at the particular location will have fallen to 10 roentgens per hour or less on 90% of the occasions that fallout could occur.
As discussed by another contributor to this symposium,2 an intensity of 10 r/hour is the limit above which re-entry into the area will not be attempted.
A third method of utilizing fallout distribution information is to tabulate the range of exposures likely to be encountered between 50% and 90'/ of the time.
Obviously, a catalogue of this type cannot be included in this paper; however, the list may be obtained from Emergency Health Services by interested officials. For our present purposes, we will consider some examples of the information available.
The following is such a classification system according to fallout distribution probability.
Class A locations: zero to 15% probability that exposure will exceed 600 roentgens.
Class B locations: 16-25% probability that exposure will exceed 600 roentgens.
Class C locations: 26.35c/ probability that exposure will exceed 600 roentgens.
Class D locations: 36-45% probability that exposure will exceed 600 roentgens.
Class E locations: 46% upwards probability that exposure will exceed 600 roentgens.
The accessibility criteria are whether or not the establishment will be accessible after either 24 or 48 hours post-fallout. The system which results, then, is exemplified as follows: Table III gives examples of exposures which might be experienced in various areas in Canada which are likely to be affected by fallout. From this, it will be seen that there will be large areas in northern and western parts of the country where high radiation intensities, arising from nuclear strikes on larger cities and other targets in Canada and the northern United States, are unlikely to he encountered. In these areas, the unprotected external exposures will rarely exceed 200 to 300 roentgens, and indeed during most days of the year these values might only be one-tenth as great.
This is the sort of radiation environment which the health profession may expect to encounter in Canada in the event of nuclear war. Variations in the weight of the fissionable component of the attack pattern will produce changes in the resulting environment, but the overall picture should not be too different from that broadly described in the preceding paragraphs. In general, locations farther away from targets will be increasingly less affected by changes in the weight of attack.
Because hospital patients are particularly sensitive to gamma radiation, and because the radiological life of scarce health manpower must be conserved, it is important that in the face of the above-described hazard the shielding capability of establishments be known to those officials responsible for the health of patients and staffs. From these figures and the specifications of the building, the total mass thickness of the wails and the total mass thickness of the roof can be computed. These values, together with a correction for openings and the characteristics previously mentioned, yield a figure which is known as the "protection factor" of the building. Protection factor has been defined in an earlier paragraph. In an area which it is anticipated is to be used as a shelter area during fallout, the normal openings must be filled in and baffle walls provided in front of doorways and essential passages. When this is done, the total mass thicknesses of the walls and the roof should be about 200-250 for the walls and 125-175 for the roof, in order that the area enclosed will have a protection factor of 100. ideally a well, sufficient bed and working space, heat and fuel, and necessary medical requirements. When an appreciation of the building's strengths and weaknesses has been made, the medical director or hospital administrator can decide what areas are possible for use as radiation shelters. It is unlikely that any hospital will have an area which requires no improvement in order to be usable as a fallout shelter. Even large institutions having subbasements with high protective factors will find that changes and additions will be necessary to render the area habitable. Such improvements do not require discussion here; they are within the scope of normal health knowledge.
Improvement of protection against radiation, however, is worth further comment.
Im prOc ing the Protection Factor
Having inspected the building as has been described, a good idea of its general value as shelter will have been obtained and the good and bad areas noted. Where will there be need for improvement? How can such improvement be effected? Essentially, it involves filling openings, increasing the mass thickness of walls, floors and roofs, and extending essential services. This may be summarized as follows.
Ways of Improving the Protection
Factor of a Building 1. Fill (or provide for such filling) openings such as windows, and unnecessary doorways, with concrete blocks.
2. Increase the mass thickness of exterior walls. 3. Increase the total overhead mass thickness, i.e. the sum of the roof and intervening floors.
4. Increase the mass thickness of selected interior walls to provide improved local areas.
It is usually cheaper to thicken walls than Ceilings and also, for engineering reasons, there is a limit to the amount of additional weight that can be imparted to ceilings and roofs. In considering how to distribute the added mass necessary to bring up the degree of protection, therefore, it is economically desirable to balance the roof and wall masses in favour of the walls (Table VI) .
To illustrate the application of the principles and methods which have been described, two studies which Emergency Health Services and Hos- It is usually more economical to put mass thickness into walls than into roofs.
Arrange things such that the roof contribution to the total dose is about 50% more than is the groun(1 contribution.
Thus: to achieve P.F. pital Design Division of the Department of National Health and Welfare have made will be described.
In both studies the hospitals were 50-bed hospitals, but they differed greatly in design and structural materials.
The Almonte Hospital:
This is a 50-bed, basementless hospital of two floors. The area suitable for use for shelter would be the ground floor after the protection factor had been suitably increased. The specifications of the building "as is" are as follows: Area 65 ft. x 182 ft., giving 11,800 sq. ft. This 50-bed hospital is of different construction from the Almonte hospital, having a large percentage of the structural members of lumber. It consists of a semi-basement and an upper floor. The walls of the semi-basement are of reinforced concrete but the main exterior walls are only 4½ inch brick on a wood frame. It was clear that the obvious area for shelter would be the semi-basement. In this area the existing protection factor was only 9. This was due to the poor overhead mass.
The 2 inch strapping at 16 inch centres 3/4 inches wood lath and plaster To achieve a protection factor of 100 in the semi-basement of this building requires that the overhead mass thickness be brought up to about 140 p.s.f. and the exterior walls be brought up to around 200 p.s.f. This can be done by the addition of an 8 inch layer of concrete and 1 inch metal lath and plaster to the basement ceiling. The above-grade basement walls require an additional layer of 8 inches concrete block and a layer of lath and plaster. Window openings should be ifiled (or be capable of being filled in emergency) with 12 inch concrete blocks. Door openings should be screened with a 12 inch concrete baffle wall. The protection factor provided by these improvements will be 110.
What then has been gained by these improvements?
There has been provided in each hospital a shelter area capable of functioning and housing the patients and staff under the emergency conditions of radioactive fallout. The protection factor of the area has been brought up to a value of 100+. This means that, even in areas where the critical 96-hour exposure in an unshielded locality is 2500 r, the patients and staff in the shelter would be exposed only to 25 r; in other words, it is the difference between being dead and not even sick.
In areas of greater intensity where the unprotected exposure would reach 7000-8000 r, the exposure of those in the shelter would range from 70-80 r, which, although undesirable, would not be grave for patients whilst it would fall within the permitted limits for operational personnel.
SUMMARY
The foregoing pages have attempted to provide health authorities with an idea of the gamma radiation hazard which they might expect hospitals and other health establishments to experience.
The importance of knowing beforehand the shielding capability of their establishment is emphasized, and a description of the structural characteristics of .i building that influence shielding capacity is given. Two examples of hospital buildings on which shielding analyses have been conducted are used as illustrations.
I have to thank Mr. George Peck, Hospital Design Division, Department of National Health and Welfare, for the analysis of the Almonte and Sackville Hospitals.
T HERE is abundant evidence from experimental work in animals and observations on man following exposure that ionizing radiation usually has a deleterious effect on the immunity mechanism. Large doses of ionizing radiation induce severe "radiation sickness" in man and animals which is manifested by a typical complex of symptoms. Changes in the immunobiological reactions play an important part in producing this state of affairs. Small doses may have no outward effect, the only manifestations being those that affect the hematop()ietic system.
GENERAL RADIATION EFFECTS1
The effects of radiation depend not only on the total dose but also on the rate of absorption and on the region of the body exposed. One thousand rem (see glossary of terms) in a single dose would usually be fatal if the whole body were exposed, but there would be no noticeable external effects in the majority of persons if 1000 rem were applied more or less evenly over a period of 30 years. Different parts of the body have different sensitivities, and some individuals are more sensitive than others. The most radiosensitive parts of the 1)ody include the lymphoid tissue, bone marrow, spleen, organs of reproduction and the gastrointestinal tract. ABSTRACT Ionizing radiation has a deleterious effect on the immunity mechanism, particularly when large hut sublethal doses are applied over a short period of time. The hematopoietic system is extremely sensitive, and a fall in the lymphocytes is one of the most characteristic manifestations. The normal balance of the microflora of the intestinal and respiratory tracts is disturbed, which results in a bacteremia and may lead to death of the host. Active immunity is seriously interfered with if the irradiation occurs shortly before the injection of an antigen. There is also reduced resistance to pathogenic micro-organisms, which may lead to fatal infections. Prolonged irradiation at low levels does not seem to affect immunity adversely. Active immunization should be carried out well in advance of exposure to radiation, and supportive treatment commenced immediately after exposure to large doses.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ACUTE WHOLE BODY RADIATION INJURY TO hUMAN BEINGS'
Twenty-five to 100 rem produce no disabling sickness, but blood changes occur and there is a drop in lymphocytes and granulocytes.
